Jenin the Ruin

"A West Bank Ruin, Reborn as a Peace Beacon"
By Ethan Bronner
Published September 11, 2008, A1

The front page of the September 11, 2008 New York Times features an inspiring headline. In “A West Bank Ruin, Reborn as a Peace Beacon," Ethan Bronner reports on the new plan to turn the Palestinian city of Jenin into a Fatah-run model of security and economic cooperation. You know it's going to be a long march through scores of trite and meaningless lines after the first five words. So Bronner loses a style points for "Pessimism is a steady companion...". His real lapses, though, are on substance. Bronner provokes little thought and omits plenty of context. He also manages to get ugly, by defaming Israel only two paragraphs in. About Jenin's troubled history:

“In 2002, in response to a wave of suicide bombers from Jenin, Israeli tanks leveled entire neighborhoods."

After six years, it should be clear to any observer, let alone journalist, that Israeli tanks did not level entire neighborhoods in Jenin. Better serving readers would be this longer and more accurate backgrounder:

“In 2002, in response to a wave of suicide bombers from Jenin, the Israeli government ordered its army into that city, known to many Palestinians as "the martyrs' (suicide bombers') capital," and to Israelis as a terrorist haven. Israel's stated reason for the operation, in Jenin’s refugee camp, was to arrest those recruiting, dispatching and financing the bombers, as well as to expose and destroy bomb labs and weapons caches and factories.

Militant groups in Jenin, in preparation for Israel's "Operation Defensive Shield," turned most of the camp into a battlefield, extensively booby-trapping buildings and placing mines. Many of the homes fit with explosives were those of militants wanted by Israel. After a week of house-to-house fighting, about 10% of the buildings in Jenin's refugee camp had been destroyed.”

Whether or not Bronner felt this extra context would take too much space, his description is short, dumb and unacceptable. Not only does it paint Israel's response to terrorism as vengeful, cruel and without clear purpose, it reports things that didn't happen. It is very likely most leveling was done by Palestinian militants, who boasted to CNN how many explosives they planted, trapping Israeli soldiers searching buildings.

For effect, we read of tanks leveling entire neighborhoods. Behold Israel's awesome, unbridled power. One might imagine Chinatown and SoHo being leveled. Why? Because some kids from there strapped on belts and blew themselves up.

To read Bronner's description of the battle in Jenin and be truly appalled, one should know the following: Jenin's refugee camp is the only part of Jenin which saw Israeli action in 2002 (unmentioned); It's made up of one neighborhood. (mentioned -- he actually refers, himself, to the camp as "a tough neighborhood of 16,000.") 10% of the buildings were considered destroyed. (unmentioned). Of these buildings, Palestinians destroyed many, if not most of them. (unmentioned). With the six year storm of lies surrounding Israel's actions in Jenin, one wonders if Bronner didn't just turn to Wikipedia.

Bronner reports the aim of the new Jenin plan, different from previous two-state plans, is to establish meaningful relationships from the "bottom-up," rather than "impose coexistence from the top down." It's refreshing for this logical approach to peace to appear in the Times, which often editorializes for a agreement signed as soon as possible. The logic cited for this quick and dirty is that as the occupation drags on, extremists are gaining legitimacy daily.

Bronner cites Israel's defense minister Ehud Barak as praising the Palestinian police in Jenin. "Mr. Barak's words are telling," writes Bronner, since "Israeli defense officials do not make a habit of speaking well of Palestinian police," citing a Western official involved. Why don't these officials speak well of Palestinian police? Readers are left to assume the reason may simply be one of bias. Perhaps these Israelis just don't like or respect Palestinians. To clue in readers, Bronner needed only to ask one of these Israeli officials to find that many Palestinian police have been, and continue to be, complicit in terrorism against Israel. This would've made some sense of Israeli defense officials’ nasty little habit.

Throughout the article, Bronner reports on several positive developments. Mentioned are joint projects between Jenin and the Israeli region of Gilboa, like a Bible-Koran contest for high-school students or the regular meetings of Israeli and Palestinians civic leaders who are planning cooperation in agriculture and commerce. It's nice to hear that Israeli Arabs are playing an important role facilitating. In one of his few counterpoints, Bronner writes of Israeli Arabs' “growing radicalization and identification with the Palestinian national cause and militant Islam”.

In the Jenin plan, there are the typical pratfalls. “Each side,” Bronner reports, blames the other for the plan’s slow progress. “Israel says Palestinian forces still do not deal with terrorists and so its forces must continue night incursions.” Bronner then conveys the Palestinian “worry that the focus on Jenin will take away from the broader issues that need to be solved, like Jerusalem and refugees.”

By parsing neither of these concerns, Bronner creates an equivalence where there is none. The Palestinian obligation to do away with terrorist groups – or at least to prevent terrorist acts against Israel – has been a central tenet of all prior peace agreements. Their failing this obligation, as Israel alleges, precludes any peace on the ground with Israel. On the other hand, focusing on one aspect of peace-building doesn’t take away from others. No one will forget about Jerusalem or refugees while Jenin is trying to be rehabilitated.

Bronner casts in sharp relief the Jenin before the second Palestinian intifada and the one after it. Yet seemingly the only big events which changed things for the worse were the actions of the Israelis, not the Palestinians. Bronner states that “until the 2000 uprising,” Israeli Jews and Arabs regularly shopped in Jenin. Thousands of Palestinians from there worked in Israel. Bronner then zips ahead to “today, the main crossing point, then the site of a sprawling market, is a maze of security towers and checkpoints.” Bronner then mentions “occasional night raids” by the Israel Defense Forces, as well as restrictions on Israeli Arabs now visiting the area.

So what about this uprising? Why did Israel enforce these measures? A descriptive sentence or two on the militant takeover of Jenin, the surge in attacks on Israelis, together with the effectiveness of Israel’s response, would have sufficed. This context is missing.

Towards the end, Bronner again fairly gives a platform to both Israelis and Palestinians to express their concerns. Only this time, he let's you know. “Israeli security officials say their Palestinian colleagues are good at law and order but not at stopping terrorist groups. They say that Islamic Jihad used to be strong here and is no longer because Israel spent years destroying its infrastructure and killing its militants, setting the stage for the Palestinian security takeover. But if they relax their vigilance, the Israelis say, the situation will deteriorate.”

Here, you can tell Bronner is keen on the Palestinian line. It's a nice closer. He reports the Palestinians are "often urged to arrest someone just because he wears a beard.” Yes. Israeli forces, who daily identify and arrest wanted militants, profile bearded Palestinians -- all ten of them -- and ask their Palestinian lap dogs to go fetch. Bronner would have to agree that Israel orders its sons and daughters to bust into people's homes because they want to bust the balls of Palestinians. “As long as they (the Palestinian forces) are seen as puppets of the Israelis, the project is doomed. The key is for Palestinian security officials to be seen as agents of state building. Then the population will cooperate. This requires the kind of discretion that the Israeli army has not been known for.”

Bronner again forgets about the musts of any peace deal: Israelis and Palestinians work together on security. Israel needs to maintain the balance of power. Israel showing "discretion" probably means it would just go after ticking bombs. Even if Israel was discreet and let the Palestinian Authority (PA) do what it loves -- cracking terrorist skulls -- they'll always be seen as essentially Israel’s puppet. There is no credibility on the Palestinian street for doing what Israel dictates – and that is preventing anti-Israel incitement and terrorism. And what sort of discretion should Israel show? Would taking down those ugly security towers and checkpoints be considered showing discretion?

Israel has a more powerful army, it's better trained, it's dedicated...it's saving their own lives. Israel can do a better job. The best job. Should it sit on its hands and assume the more pragmatic of the anti-Israel Palestinian public will do more than lift a perfunctory finger to stop violence if directed at Israel? How fine a line is it between Israel "relaxing its vigilance" and its "showing discretion".

Ethan Bronner should do a better job with an important story like this. Don't repeat lines, process them. Ask smart questions and for heaven's sake, don't say Israel did things it didn't do.