A Messy Moral Equivalence

"A Gaza Truce Undone by Flaws May Be Revived by Necessity"
A11, Friday 12/19/08
By Ethan Bronner

NYT Jerusalem Bureau Chief Ethan Bronner provides a particularly poor analysis of the termination of the truce between Israel and Hamas, the ruling party of Gaza, on Friday, December 19. The lull arrangement, initiated on June 19, 2008, was designed to last for six months. Hamas has chosen not to renew the agreement. But instead of recognizing Hamas' refusal to extend the truce, which Israel has advocated, Bronner's piece is full of moral equivalence, attempting to equally parcel blame for the deterioration of the ceasefire and its recent end.

In the escalation that led to the corrosion of the agreement, Bronner writes that “Israel’s decision in early November to destroy a tunnel Hamas had been digging near the border drove the cycle of violence [language of moral equivalence] to a much higher level.” Why is Israel’s decision to destroy the tunnel seen as the spur for this “cycle of violence”? Should Israel not have engaged what it deemed an imminent threat? It is better stated that Hamas’ aggressive decision to build a tunnel toward the Israeli border, the same tool used to kidnap Gilad Shalit in June 2006, was the cause of this spiral of violence (a spiral has a clear beginning whereas a cycle has no clear beginning or end, resulting in ambiguous accountability).

Moving onto the failure to renew the ceasefire, Bronner gives voice to two main Hamas talking points:

• The level of goods passing through the Gaza border crossings “never began to approach what Hamas thought it was going to get: a return to the 500 to 600 truckloads delivered daily before the closing, including appliances, construction materials and other goods essential for life beyond mere survival.”
• “In addition, Israeli forces continued to attack Hamas and other militants in the West Bank, prompting Palestinian militants in Gaza to fire rockets.”

He doesn’t mention that neither of these elements were part of the agreement. Regarding the crossings, it is unclear where Bronner got the astronomical figure of “500 to 600 truckloads” (perhaps the number of trucks passing into Gaza while the Palestinian Authority was still in control of the Strip). Israel’s obligation was to re-open the crossings and increase the level of goods passing into Gaza, which it clearly did, despite continued rocket fire. On the second point relating to the West Bank, it was clear to all parties that this territory was not included as part of the ceasefire.

Having offered the Hamas talking points, Bronner then creates an equation of equivalence with Israeli hopes that “that the agreement would lead to progress on Corporal Shalit’s release, or at least to increased information on his condition or negotiations over an exchange for him.” Let it be clear that this equivalence does not exist. Palestinian terrorist operatives employed violence to address their objections to the agreement while Israel never used violence or closed border crossings to protest the lack of progress on the Shalit issue. It is unsettling that Bronner draws this equivalence given its baseless grounds.

In the end, Bronner believes that “both sides need the truce, so they will probably grope their way back to it.” If that is the case, then why did Hamas choose to end it whereas Israel was willing to extend it? Why is this basic fact not stated?

Moral equivalence is a convenient device, but frequently fails to illuminate the truth.