"For Israel, 2006 Lessons but Old Pitfalls"
A1, Wednesday 1/7/09
By Steven Erlanger
Erlanger has a point that there is an Israeli “political and diplomatic inability to decide on clear objectives for the outcome of the war (in Gaza). However, he goes too far in suggesting these are a few of the lessons of Lebanon that Israel “has not so well applied.”
Diplomatic:
Erlanger fails to entertain the possibility that Israel may have reason to be vague about its objectives. This is actually a lesson Israel has learned from Lebanon, when press coverage was filled with Israeli bombast. That Israel’s military advances failed to match the bluster [Hezbollah defeated, soldiers returned alive], most concluded that Israel lost the war.
Political:
Erlanger suggests that Olmert, Barak and Livni are not on the same page with the Gaza operation’s objectives. Provided as evidence is nothing more than analysts noting that the three leaders “quite openly don’t get along”. For this, we need analysts? While Israel has pointed out time and again that stopping the rocket fire is its objective, it’s not unreasonable to suggest Israel’s top leadership disagrees on the more final objective: weaken Hamas and “achieve a sustainable cease-fire,” or “bring about a collapse of the Hamas government.”
It’s safe to assume deposing Hamas is a goal shared by all in Israel’s top leadership. Erlanger doesn’t go near there, but he also doesn’t attempt to explain why Israel hasn’t stated clear objectives – outside of stopping rocket fire. Furthermore, he doesn't read into the leeway this offers. Israel may argue that for the rockets to stop, Hamas must be deposed.
To validate his thesis, Erlanger uses two former generals, but states deceptively “according to senior Israeli military officials". This article also skirts bigger issues: Israel will not allow a Hamas regime to remain in power for long; if a cease-fire is reached, how will that be the beginning of Hamas’ end?
The biggest void in this analysis:
Many have concluded that Israel's flawed Lebanon strategy led it to accept a defective cease-fire (UNSC Resolution 1701), which has led to Hezbollah's rearmament and encampment on Israel’s northern border. Israel is keen on not making the same mistake. This involves further damaging Hamas and not rushing to accept just any cease-fire, a strategy with which the Times disagrees.
Thus, the biggest lesson from Lebanon yet to be applied - because it conflicts with the Times' view - failed to make it into this analysis.
Wednesday, January 7, 2009
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