The "Old Battle" Not So Old

"The New Meaning Of an Old Battle"
WK1, Week in Review, Sunday, 1/4/09
By Steven Lee Myers

Steven Lee Myers makes a good point that a "convincing defeat of Hamas" would help undercut Iran's strategy of destroying ["tormenting" he terms it] Israel, "spreading its influence in the Arab world," and furthering its nuclear program. Importantly, Myers offers a "sobering caveat" by Martin Indyk that things would need to get "significantly worse before they could get better." The deposing of Hamas should be implicit in this assertion.

The rest of Myers' analysis is marred by shallow clichés about Israel - past and present:

1. Israel's operation "can prevent Arab nations from working with Israel".

- Absent an overall Arab acceptance of Israel, a remote possibility, what Arab nations, aside from a foot-dragging Egypt and un-influential Jordan, are willing to "work" with Israel?

2. "Inflamed Arab population" in a rift with Arab nations "willing to deal with Israel."

- The rift isn't so great; these nations – through state-run media, official statements and official rallies – are the ones helping to inflame. This week, Jordanian legislators burnt the Israeli flag.

3. The "image of carnage could fuel new hatreds."

- Incessant and extremely popular propaganda fuels new hatreds. New images of carnage are a few sprinkles in this river.

4. "...and radicalize some who felt that peace talks offer more hope than resistance."

- The few who genuinely favor compromise with Israel hold a uniquely radical position in the Arab and Muslim worlds and thus would not have a sea change after an Israeli operation, which are unfortunately not uncommon.

5. Israel "largely lost" the 1982 Lebanon campaign because it created Hezbollah.

- Yet Lee Myers acknowledges the campaign "accomplished the goal" of eliminating the PLO threat "encamped" on Israel's northern border. This highlights the lose-lose Old Battle world in which Israel still finds itself, but too nuanced for Lee Myers to see.

So looking at the '82 campaign:

No 1982 operation = PLO mini-state encamped on Israel's northern border
Yes 1982 operation = Hezbollah mini-state encamped on Israel's northern border

That the latter is an arm of the mullahs may be scarier, but nevertheless, doesn't retroactively tag a loss on the operation.

6. The "fighting was emboldening Palestinian resistance".

- If anything, Israel's withdrawals (in Lebanon, the West Bank and Gaza) have emboldened resistance. It doesn't really matter, listening to leaders of the "resistance," like Nizar Rayyan, a Hamas commander Israel killed this week:

"If you kill us, we will become martyrs, and we will win. If you refrain from killing us, whether from fear or political expedience or moral considerations, we have only cemented our victory."

7. "What do we [Palestinians] have after this year [after Annapolis]?"

- Lee Myers lets this propaganda slip by, when he should know about the PA’s intransigence: publicly rejecting Israel as a Jewish state right after Annpolis; rejecting any proposal that don't conform exactly to the '49 armistice lines; promoting the right of return, as well as virulent anti-Israel propaganda.

8. If "fighting" ends by Inauguration Day, "Obama will be able to capitalize on the cease-fire to renew a push for a permanent settlement."

- So Hamas will stick around and together with Fatah, sign a peace deal with Israel, officially ending the conflict. This is an outcome within reach for Obama, if he can just capitalize on the cease-fire when he assumes office. This passes for analysis?

Near the end, the writer aptly points out in the piece that Israel's reliance on a UN resolution ending the 2006 Lebanon war hasn't served its purpose, as Hezbollah has been rearmed.

He points out Abbas is a "weak" leader, but doesn't make the connection that armed struggle against Israel is central to Palestinian leadership, and thus negotiations might be a bit fruitless right now.

He notes a problem of allowing Hamas to remain in power, yet lets two Palestinian commentators, Mustafa Barghouti and Ziad Asali, along with Israeli analyst Daniel Levy, drive home the ludicrous point that Hamas not only should be left in power, but must ultimately be included in any peace deal.

Lee Myers employs his own logic to assert peace is within reach. Such thinking – with its calls for change in Israeli behavior to empower the moderates, while weakening Hamas' radical platform – is unintelligent, and will lead to Israel getting the blame with the next breakdown.

Simply put, there's no argument here that the new battle, like the old one, can be solved right now through negotiation.